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Recent criticism from different sides has expressed the view that, with scarce resources, there 
is little justification for massive public funding of higher education. Central to the debate is 
the  conjecture  that  colleges  and  universities  use  their  resources  inefficiently  and  focus 
insufficiently on their mission to expand students’ human potential. Our aim in this paper is to 
examine the theoretical premises of this conjecture in a small open economy and uncover the 
conditions under which public investment in higher education is efficient and desirable. We 
analyze  non-stationary  equilibria  of  an  OLG  economy,  characterized  by  perfect  capital 
mobility, intergenerational transfers  and  a  hierarchical  education  system.  The  government 
uses  income  tax  revenues  to  finance  basic  education  and  support  higher  education  that 
generates skilled labor. Given this, the following issues are considered: (a) the impact of 
education and international markets on the equilibrium number of low-skilled and skilled 
workers  in  each  generation;  (b)  the  economic  efficiency  of  public  subsidies  to  higher 
education in generating skilled human capital; (c) the endogenous support for a government’s 
educational policies found in a political equilibrium. 
JEL-Code: D910, E250, H520. 
Keywords:  hierarchical  education,  innate  ability,  capital  mobility,  education  policy,  low-
skilled workers, skill formation. 
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Higher education is currently being criticized by scholars, politicians, and the popular 
press who demand that higher education institutions undertake reforms. The claim is 
that colleges and universities bear the financial costs of very costly bureaucracies and 
other non-academic activities while in many cases fail to achieve their core mission of 
increasing the skills and human potential of the individual student (see Hacker and 
Dreifus, 2010). These demands for value from higher education institutions have been 
triggered by ever rising tuition fees and shaky economic conditions. This is happening 
worldwide but is more pronounced in Western countries where governments plan to 
cut their contributions to higher education (see, e.g., UK, USA, the Netherlands and 
Israel). Since public resources are generally scarce, choices have to be made and the 
following questions are often raised: (i) What is the justification for public 
participation in funding higher education? (ii) For developing countries, should 
funding of higher education be a priority or, perhaps, should resources be used to 
upgrade the quality of compulsory schooling? The objective of this paper is to address 
these tradeoffs formally in an open-economy equilibrium framework. 
  Nowadays, educational policy can hardly be implemented without 
incorporating some relevant international aspects, even for decisions that are 
considered 'domestic' such as compulsory schooling. In most countries, especially for 
the developed ones, higher education generates a significant part of a country’s stock 
of skilled labor. As a result, it affects the marginal returns to physical capital and 
channels the limited supply of foreign investments. Despite its importance there are 
very few studies that capture the way in which international market conditions 
directly influence governments’ allocation of resources and individuals’ decision-
making regarding the acquisition of additional training and skills.  
  1  Balancing the government budget is an important constraint on education 
policy. This has been expressed by the popular view: 
“If you want to have a new program, figure out a way to pay for it 
without raising taxes”
  US Senate Majority Leader H Reid
1. 
 
This quote stresses the importance of including both sides of the government balance 
sheet when the effects of new policies are examined. This issue is also confirmed by 
studies dealing with the empirics of growth which show that the growth effects of 
public education spending are generally mixed except when the method of finance is 
properly accounted for in which case they are clearly positive (see, e.g., Bassanini and 
Scarpenta, 2001; Blankenau et al., 2007b).  
  Lastly, another important point is the net social benefits that accrue from 
public investments in higher education. The social costs of acquiring skills include 
expenses incurred by society that performs the education and training, necessary 
expenses by each individual to acquire skills, as well as the foregone income that 
would have been earned otherwise. Low-skilled workers are important contributors to 
the government budget since the tax revenues collected from their labor income are 
used to finance all parts of public education, though they do not directly benefit from 
these investments (see Garrat and Marshall, 1994; Fernandez and Rogerson, 1995; 
Gradstein and Justman, 1995; Bevia and Iturbe-Ormaetxe, 2002). The social benefits 
include higher earnings enjoyed directly by individuals as well as the indirect benefits 
that the economy derives from the human capital generated via the higher education 
system. The latter include, for example, a capacity to absorb new production 
technologies, a higher marginal return to physical capital which gives rise to inflows 
of foreign physical capital. Given this background, is a government funding policy, 
like a subsidy to all individuals who wish to attend higher education, going to lead to 
                                                 
1 US Senator H. Reid on Face the Nation, CBS News Transcript, Nov 12, 2006. 
  2a net social benefit? Other programs like poverty relief and improved basic education 
may generate a higher social value than investing in higher education (Johnson, 
1984). Our paper studies 'efficient' education policies in small open economies. 
  Our analysis is carried out in an overlapping-generations model with 
heterogeneous agents and, starting from some initial conditions, computes and traces 
non-stationary competitive equilibria. Parents are altruistic in that they care about 
their offspring and derive utility from his/her lifetime income. Within this setting, 
the following issues will be analyzed in equilibrium: (i) the partition of the set of 
individuals between low-skilled and skilled workers in each generation; (ii) the 
evolving role of public subsidies to higher education on efficiency and the stock of 
human capital; (iii) the endogenous support for government educational policies 
generated within a political equilibrium. 
  Using a general process of hierarchical education and comparing dynamic 
equilibrium paths period by period, we obtain the following results: (a) Under certain 
conditions some public support in funding higher education will enhance the 
economy’s human capital and growth; (b) Under certain conditions, society may be 
better off when no public funds are allocated to higher education; (c) The shape of the 
distribution of endowments of individuals matters for the allocation of public funds in 
a political equilibrium. In a society with a majority of low-skilled workers the median 
voter will oppose any public financing of higher education; (d) In equilibrium with a 
balanced budget, the marginal rate of substitution between expenditure on basic 
education and expenditure on higher education is larger than unity; (e) If an open 
economy is relatively more endowed with physical capital, then upon free capital 
mobility, outflows of physical capital will bring about an increase in the unskilled 
labor force. 
  3  Some features of our model have been analyzed before in other hierarchical 
education frameworks. Particularly, Driskill and Horowitz (2002) study the optimal 
investment in hierarchical human capital and find that the optimal program exhibits a 
non-monotonicity in human capital stocks. In Su (2004) the emphasis is on efficiency 
and income inequality in a hierarchical education system. She also studies the effects 
on growth of introducing subsidies to higher education (while total education budget 
assigned to basic and higher education is fixed). Su (2006) studies the endogenous 
allocation of the public budget when a top class has a dominant political power. 
Blankenau (2005) finds a critical level of expenditure above which higher education 
should be subsidized since its impact on growth is positive. Arcalean and Schiopu 
(2008) study the interaction between public and private spending in a two-stage 
education system. As in our framework, they observe that increased enrollment in 
tertiary education does not always imply higher economic growth. 
  The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines the individual 
preferences, describes the multistage formation of human capital in an OLG economy 
and characterizes the non-stationary competitive equilibria. Section 3 studies the 
partition of the workforce into ’low-skilled’ and ’skilled’ workers and its dependency 
on education variables and international factor prices. Section 4 analyzes the 
implications of public funding of higher education for growth and for efficiency. 
Section 5 introduces a political equilibrium in our model and examines majority 
voting to allocate education tax revenues. Section 6 contains concluding remarks. The 
Appendix contains most of the proofs to facilitate the reading. 
 2.   The Economic Framework and Dynamic Equilibrium 
 
Our research strategy in this section is first to specify the lifetime preferences of 
agents in the economy and derive their optimal behaviour. Optimal decision variables 
  4are then aggregated to obtain variables like the economy’s human capital and 
government budget balance. Subsequently, the competitive equilibrium is fully 
characterized. 
 
Preferences and Hierarchical Education 
  Consider an overlapping generation economy with a continuum of 
consumers in each generation, each living for three periods. During the early 
stage each child is engaged in education/training, but takes no economic 
decisions. Individuals are economically active during the working period which 
is followed by the retirement period. At the beginning of the working period, 
each parent gives birth to one offspring, hence we assume no population growth. 
Each household is characterized by a family name  [ ] 0,1 ω∈ [  where  ] 0,1 Ω=  
denotes the set of all families in each generation. We also denote by μ   the 
Lebesgue measure on Ω. 
 Consider  generation  t, denoted  ,  which consists of all individuals  t G ω  born 
at the outset of date t, and let  1() t h ω +  be the human capital of ω at the beginning 
of the working period. We  assume that  1() t h ω + is achieved by a hierarchical 
production process of human capital like in Restuccia and Urrutia (2004): it 
consists of fundamental  education (assumed to be compulsory) and higher 
education.
2  A child obtains his general skills from the compulsory basic 
education and acquires eventually specialized skills from higher education. 
Innate ability of an individual ω, denoted by  1 t () θ ω + % , is assumed to be random 
and drawn (at birth) from a time-independent distribution. Namely, we assume 
that abilities are independent and identically distributed random variables across 
                                                 
2 See also Su (2004), Blankenau and Camera (2006).  
  5individuals in each generation and over time. 
  The human capital of individual ω  in  acquired by attending 
compulsory education, depends on parental inputs as well as school inputs, and it 
is assumed to be given by the following process: 
, t G
(1)     11 1 () () () tt t hh t X
ν ξ ωθω ω ++ = %  
where  () t h ω   stands for parents’ human capital and  t X  represents  public 
investment in early-life and compulsory schooling.
3 The above human capital 
formation process is a representation of the complex interaction between innate 
ability, family dynamics and public intervention. It stresses the key role played 
by the individual home environment that is specific to each ω via the individual 
parental human capital and the public resources invested in public education that 
are common to all. The elasticities ν  and  ξ   represent the effectiveness of 
parents’ human capital in their efforts towards educating their child, and the 
efficiency of public education in generating human capital respectively: ν  is 
affected by home education and family background while ξ  is affected by the 
schooling system, teachers, size of classes, facilities, neighborhood, etc. 
  Enrollment in higher education is costly and, in most countries, requires 
the payment of a tuition fee at each date t, denoted by   and assumed to satisfy: 
. We assume that the government may participate in the cost of higher 
education, and these subsidies are financed by taxing wage incomes of the 
working individuals. Denote by   the government (or public) allocation to each 
*
t z
* 1 t z >
t g
                                                 
3Researchers in a number of fields have showed that investments in care and education early in 
children’s lives carry high individual and social rates of returns. The most recent evidence is reviewed 
in Cunha et al. (2006). It is therefore not surprising to see increases in pre-primary enrolments. In 
a number of OECD countries (The Czech Republic, Germany, New Zealand and Poland) annual 
expenditures per student are higher on pre-primary education than on primary education (OECD, 
2009, Table B1.1a). 
  6student wishing to attain additional skills via the higher education systems. Thus, 
 is the net payment that each individual pays at date t to access 
higher education.
* () tt t zz z ω == − t g
4 Hence, the cost of higher education is the same for all 
students of the same generation. For simplicity, we assume that the tuition and 
public funding are denominated in dollars of the working period of the student 
(e.g., it can be financed by students loan), and, throughout our analysis, we take the 
education tax imposed on wage incomes constant at the rate τ . 
  We assume that acquiring higher education augments each individual’s 
basic skills by some factor  1 B > . Thus if individual ω  invests money   and 
time to study in the tertiary education system, then his/her human capital 
accumulation process increases to the level:  
*
t z
(2)     11 1 1 () () () tt t t hB h B h t X
ν ξ ωθ ω ++ + == % ω  
He/she is then called a skilled worker. To simplify our analysis (without 
restricting the generality) we assume that B is time-independent. In contrast, if an 
agent ω does not enroll in higher education, his/her human capital is determined 
solely by compulsory schooling education, hence:  
(3)     11 1 1 () () () () tt t t hh h t X
ν ξ ωω θ ω ω ++ + == %  
We call this agent a low-skilled worker. Instead of attending some higher 
education institute, following the basic education attained, a low-skilled agent 
works during part of his youth period using basic skills given in (3). We assume 
that all low-skilled individuals do work during a portion m ( <1) of their 
youth period. Since they work fully at period 
0 m ≤
1 t +  as well, the lifetime after-tax 
                                                 
4Public funding provides only a share of investments in tertiary education. In 2006 the proportion of 
private funding of tertiary education ranged between 3.6% in Denmark and 83.9% in Chile (OECD, 
2009, Table B3.2b). Different combinations of tuition fees and government subsidies in our model can 
reproduce the relative importance of private funding observed in the data. 
  7wage income earned by a low-skilled worker ω is: 
    [ ] 11 1 (1 ) ( ) (1 tt hm w w τω ++ −+ 1 ) t r t + +   
where  is the return to capital at date t+1;  and  1 (1 ) t r+ + t w 1 t w + are the wage rates 
per unit of effective labor at date t and t+1 respectively. In contrast, a skilled 
worker’s after-tax lifetime wage earnings are:  
    11 1 (1 ) ( ) tt Bhw τ ω + + −   
  There is little disagreement about the presence of intergenerational transfers 
(between parents and their children) in developed and developing countries. These 
transfers arise from altruistic motives of parents, regarding the well-being of their 
child, and are expressed in the various forms of investment in education that affect 
future earnings, and of tangible transfers like inter vivos gifts and bequests (see 
Viaene and Zilcha, 2002; Zilcha, 2003). In our framework, we assume that parents 
care about the future of their offspring and derive utility directly from the lifetime 
income of their child.
5 In particular, the lifetime preferences of each  t G ω∈   are 
represented by the Cobb-Douglas utility function: 




1 () () () ()
yo
tt t t Uc c y
α
ωω ω + =   ω
(4)                             123 1 α αα ++≤  
Consumption when young and old is denoted by  ()
y
t c ω and  ()
o
t c ω  respectively; 
1() t y ω + is the offspring’s lifetime income. Intergenerational transfers that arise from 
the altruistic motives represented by (A1) take three forms. First, the earning capacity 
of the younger generation is enhanced by taxes parents pay to finance the education 
budget, and as a result to enhance their human capital level. Second, parents are 
                                                 
5Thus we depart from the dynastic model where the utility functions of all future generations 
enter this utility function. 
  8willing to contribute to the tuition fees that allow access to higher education. Lastly, 
under the above preferences, parents are willing to transfer tangible assets directly as 
well. 
 Denote  by  ( ) t b ω the transfer of physical capital by household  t G ω∈  to his/her 
offspring. Given the return to capital and wages { } , tt rw
1 (1 ) rb
, lifetime non-wage income of 
an offspring, whether skilled and low-skilled, is  ( ). tt ω + +  Thus, lifetime income 
of a low-skilled worker (denoted by l) is: 
(5)  [ ] 111 1 1 ( ) (1 ) ( ) (1 ) (1 ) ( )
l
tt t t t t yh m w r w r t b ω τω +++ + + =− + + ++ ω
t b
 
If he/she is a skilled worker (denoted by s) then: 
(6)   11 1 1 () ( 1 ) () ( 1 )()
s
tt t t yh w r ω τω ++ + + =− ++ ω  
  Given (2) and (3) it is straightforward to obtain the aggregate (or mean as 
well in our case) human capital   that is available to the economy at date t. Let 
  denote the subset of individuals in   who  are  skilled and let ∼  be  the 
complement of  , namely the set of low-skilled individuals. Hence:  
t H
t A t G t A
t A
(7)   1
~




Hhd m h d ω μω ω μω = + + ∫∫  
Therefore, government tax revenues are simply  tt wH τ  where   is defined in (7). On 
the other side of its balance sheet the government faces total education expenditure (in 
both stages). Denote by 
t H
( ) t A μ   the measure of skilled individuals who receive 
some public funding for higher education. Then the government budget 
constraint at date t is: 
(8)     1
~
[( )( ) ( )( ) ] (
t
tt tt t t
A
wh d mh d Xg A τω μ ω ω μ ω μ + += ∫∫ ) +
We say that an education policy {( , )} tt X g  is feasible if at each date t: (a) given 
  9t X  and  , the set of skilled    is determined by each individual's ‘optimal 
choice’ and (b) condition (8) holds in all periods t. 
t g t A
  We consider a small open economy that, as of date  0 t = , is integrated into 
the rest of the world such that physical capital is internationally mobile while 
labor is kept internationally immobile. As a result, { } t r  is equal to the foreign 
interest rate. Production is carried out by competitive firms that produce a single 
commodity which is both consumed and used as production input. Physical 
capital   (assumed to fully depreciate) and effective human capital  are 
inputs of a neo-classical production function that satisfies the standard 
conditions: it exhibits constant returns to scale; it is strictly increasing, concave, 






Given  , education policy  0 H 0 , )} tt t Xg {(
∞
= ,  the international prices of capital and 
labor { } , tt rw, and the tax rate  , τ each  agent ω  at  time t  with intergenerational 
transfers  1() t b ω −   chooses the level of savings  () t s ω  and  bequest  () t b ω  together 
with the financial investment in higher education  ( t z ) ω , so as to maximize: 
(9)    Max  ( ) ( ) ()
12 3
1 () () ()
yo




ωωω ω +   =
subject to constraints  
(10)     () 0 t z ω =    or   
* () tt zz ω t g = −  
(11)       () () () () 0
y
tt t t t cy s b z ω ω ω −−≥ () ωω =−
1 tt cr + (12)       () ( 1 )() 0
o
t s ωω =+ ≥
where  ( t ) y  and  1() t y ω +  are the corresponding incomes given either by (5) or (6),  ω
  10while  1() t h ω +   is defined either by (2) if () 0 t z ω = , or by (3) if  . 
Given ,
* () tt zz ω =− t g
t 0 , KH 0 0 {( ( ), ( ), ( ), , }
yo
ttt t t ccs w r ωω ω ( ), ( )); t t b z ω ω
∞
= is  a  competitive 
equilibrium if: 
(i)  For each date t, given factor prices  ) , ( t t w r   and public education policy 
0, the optimum under conditions (9)-(12) for household  {( , Xg )} tt t
∞
= ω  with bequest 
) ( 1 ω − t b is ( () , tt cc () ,() ,() ,(
yo
t t t s b z ) ) ω ωωω
Xg
ω ≥0. 
(ii)  Given the aggregate production function, the wage rate of effective labor  t w  is 
determined by the marginal product of (effective) human capital. 
(iii)   The education policy  0 {( , )} tt t
∞
=  is feasible, hence the government budget 
constraint in (8) holds at each date t. 
  After substituting all constraints, first order conditions that lead to the 
necessary and sufficient conditions for an optimum are (assuming interior solutions): 































From (12), (13) and (14): 








++ =+  
Using (15) and the definitions of income in (5) and (6), we obtain the expression for 
bequest if the offspring turns out to become low skilled:  
[ ]

























Likewise for a skilled offspring: 























As noted in (16) and (17), we assume that intergenerational transfers are 
unidirectional and therefore cannot take negative values in equilibrium. Comparing 
(16) to (17), it is clear that the incidence of m, other things equal, decreases the 
transfer of tangible assets across generations. Also, due to free capital mobility, both 
intergenerational transfers are affected by international market conditions. The reason 
is that when altruistic rational parents make forward-looking decisions regarding 
direct financial transfers and/or investment in attaining skills, they actually compare 
the return to physical capital with the return to human capital. Thus, in such 
considerations they take into account the interest rate and the future wage rate 
respectively. 
 3. Equilibrium Sets of Skilled and Low-Skilled Workers 
The government budget sheet in (8) records the tax contributions made by workers 
and the public financial support that students in higher education receive while 
acquiring skills. In (8) both student types are represented by~  and  t A ( ) t A μ  and in 
order to maintain government budget balance throughout our analysis, it is the 
important task of this section to determine both sets explicitly. 
 
Reduced-form Lifetime Preferences 
From the first order conditions (13) and (14) we obtain 
( ) 12 1 1 () / () / ( 1 )
y
tt Cy ωα α ω ++ =+ t r and ( )
0
23 1 /( tt Cy ) α α + = ω . After inserting these expressions 
into (9) the utility function has the following reduced-form: 
(18)    




++ ⎡⎤ =Φ + ⎣⎦ + +
 
  12where parameter Φ   is a constant independent of time and independent of ω . 
Therefore (18) is an expression for utility that holds for both skilled and low-skilled 
offspring. The reduced form utility of parents is now proportional to the lifetime 
income of their offspring where the term of proportionality is decreasing in the world 
interest factor at the future date. Thus, if education resources are allocated by a 
utilitarian social planner that maximizes the current aggregate of individual utilities, it 
maximizes at the same time next generation’s aggregate income. Lastly, whether 
parents invest in higher education of their child depends very much on their own 
utility, which entails comparison of future lifetime income of their child.  
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Notes: (a) The skilled workforce is approximated by the percentage of the population 
of age group 25-64 with at least upper secondary education; (b) In percentage, in 
2007. 
Source: OECD (2009, Table A1.2A, column 1) 
 
Education Decision 
Making use of (18), the next result defines the proportion of the population that will 
receive higher education and become skilled. It sheds some light into the observed 
cross-country variations in the skill composition of workforces in both developed and 
developing countries. For example, data in Table 1 show the skill composition of 
workforces for a subset of OECD countries and for OECD’s partner countries. The 
extent of a skilled workforce is approximated by the share of age group 25-64 with at 
  13least upper secondary education. Shares in 2007 vary largely, between 27 percent in 
Portugal and 89 percent in Estonia. 
 Define  11 () ()() tt t Zh
ν ω θω ω ++ = %  and call it the initial endowment of ω . It is the 
product of both ability and parental human capital and describes the background a 
young individual inherits prior to any education. The distribution function of  1() t Z ω +  
over the continuum of agents has a complex derivation from the underlying variables. 
On the other hand, it plays an important role in our analysis due to its impact on the 
decision to attend higher education or not. Given this, the next proposition defines the 
set of students that will attend higher education:  
Proposition 1: Let   denotes the set of individuals who choose to invest in 
higher education at date t. Then: (a)   is nonempty if and only if the following 
condition holds:  
t A
t A














(b) Assume that condition (19) holds. Define  





















. Then:  
(20)     1 {( ) tt AZ ωω + =≥ } t Λ  
Namely, all individuals with initial endowments above  t Λ  become  skilled 
workers. 
  The proof is included in the Appendix. Λt is a threshold that partitions the 
distribution function of 1() t Z ω + . Under the assumption that (19) holds, all  1 t G ω + ∈  
with an initial endowment above  t Λ will invest in higher education and become 
skilled whereas the other individuals with an initial endowment below will not  t Λ
  14invest and, hence, become unskilled.
6 Conditions (19) and (20) depend on exogenous 
factor prices and, to stress their importance, let us consider the extreme scenario of 
full public funding of higher education, namely, 
* ˆt gz t =  for all t. In this case,   
and from (20) we obtain that all individuals 
0 t z =
ω  invest in higher education given that 
condition (19) holds at all dates. Thus under full public funding inequality (19) 
implies that all young individuals become skilled, regardless of their initial 
endowments! Clearly, if the inequality in (19) is reversed all individuals will become 
low-skilled. This is possible when B is close to 1, meaning that attending higher 
education makes a small contribution to the human capital of students. Thus 
exogenous factor prices play an important role in the formation of types of workers. 
Since our analysis is relevant when the higher educational system is operative, to 
guarantee that skilled individuals exist in each generation, we assume: 
 
(A2) Given the exogenous wages and interest rates, the economy's parameters m and 
B, condition (19) holds  at all dates t , t=0, 1, 2, ….. 
  Some monotonicity results that can be verified from condition (20) are 
reported in Table 2 and should be interpreted as follows. Suppose that at date t an 
increase occurs in one of the model parameters of the first row, then the sign of the 
comparative statics of this change on either   or   is given in each relevant cell.  t A
t
t Λ
Table 2: Monotonicity Results for  and  t A   Λ
Bmξ   11 /( 1 ) tt wr ++ + t w t X
t z t g τ
t Λ -  +  -  +  -  +  -  +  -  
t A   +  -  +  -  +  -  +-  +  
                                                 
6Eicher (1996) models also a partition of the labor force between skilled and unskilled workers but it is 
individuals who make their own occupation choice based on the respective career paths as skilled or 
unskilled. 
  15Importantly, the signs of Table 2 give rise to a number of remarks.
7 Proposition 1 
deals with individual decision-making with no consideration for notions of 
equilibrium. Hence,  t X  and  enter threshold  t g t Λ  directly with no acknowledgement 
of budget balance. Table 2 reveals also some insights as to how globalization affects 
the process of skill formation. Upon capital market integration, physical capital flows 
from the low-return to the high-return country. Once the small open economy 
removes all capital controls physical capital will flow in if the economy is relatively 
less endowed in physical capital. As the marginal return decreases to the world 
interest rate the economy will experience an expansion of its skilled workforce. In 
contrast if the open economy has initially high levels of capital then capital market 
integration will bring about an increase in its unskilled workforce. Summarizing: 
 
Corollary 1: Under the above assumptions, we obtain in equilibrium that: a higher 
wage-rental ratio   at date t+1 expands the set of skilled agents at that 
date, while a lower wage-rental ratio enlarges the set of low-skilled labor.
 
1 /( 1 ) t wr + + 1 t +





7The allocation of individuals at generation t between the groups of skilled and low-skilled workers 
does not depend on the intensity of altruism 
3 α . Likewise, the stock of human capital   is 
independent of the altruism parameter. Thus, in our model the intensity of altruism does not affect 
growth, as long as  . This result is in contrast to the result obtained in dynastic models like that of 
Armellini and Basu (2009). 
t H
3 0 α >
8There is a long-standing debate in the empirical literature regarding the effects of international 
markets on wages and the size of the unskilled workforce. Some empirical studies have shown that 
international trade accounts for the rising income inequality somewhere between 0 and 20 percent. 
Hence, globalization has been a small contributor to growing wage inequalities in trading nations (see, 
e.g. Greenaway and Nelson, 2000; Winchester, 2008). Our result in Corollary 1 takes a different 
approach to the decisions of young individuals whether to acquire skills (beyond the compulsory 
education) or not and proposes a different explanation to the size of the low-skilled workforce: the 
decision is made by altruistic rational parents who give significant weight to the ability of their child, 
the family background and the foregone income due to the time spent acquiring higher education. 
Given their altruistic preferences, they decide whether to invest in their child's higher education or, 
perhaps, let him/her start working right after compulsory schooling and, hence, become a low-skilled 
worker. 





































0.417   18  
0.375   15  
0.250   15  
14   0.417   15  
14   14   0.417  
Notes: (a) Parameter m is computed as the difference between 24 (the average 
graduation age) and the ending age of compulsory schooling divided by 24 (the 
number of years in the first generation); (b) In 2006, with no change in 2007. 
Source: Authors’ own computations and OECD (2009, Table C1.1). 
 
  Table 2 identifies other model parameters that affect importantly the set of 
skilled workers  . Among these, parameter m stands out since together with   it 
represents lost earnings while studying and captures therefore the opportunity cost of 
higher education. Table 3 provides estimates of the maximum value of m  as the 
difference between the average graduation date and the ending age of compulsory 
schooling relative to the number of years in a generation. Taking the ending age of 
compulsory schooling of Table 3 and assuming further that the average graduation 
age is 24, while the first generation is 24 years long, we obtain estimates of m in 
Table 3. As parameter m  is inversely related to the ending age of compulsory 
schooling it is determined largely by institutions. Data reveal large cross-country 
differences in the opportunity cost of higher education. 
t A t w
 
Economy’s Human Capital 
 
Finally, from the analysis thus far, another important question arises: is it always true 
that an expansion of the set of skilled workers leads to a higher stock of human capital 
that is available for production activities? It all depends on the causes of this 
expansion since variables and parameters of the model have a different status. For 
  17example,  ,, ,, tt wm gX t τ  interfere directly with the government budget balance while 
the wage-rental ratio ( ) and technology parameters ( 1 /1 t w + + 1 t r + B ,ξ ) are exogenous 
to budget balance. The next proposition applies only to the latter predetermined 
variables and to fix ideas let us make the following assumption linking parameters B 
and m:   
(A3)   B > 1+m    holds. 
Proposition 2: Under the condition assumed in (A3), output declines at the current 
date t but expands in all subsequent periods  , tkk1 + ≥ , in each of the following two 
cases taking place at date t: (a) An unexpected increase in the wage-rental ratio; (b) 
A technological progress in the education sector (higher B or higher ξ ). 
The proof is based on the result of Corollary 1 and on the next lemma.  
Lemma 1: Under the condition assumed in (A3), expanding the set   at  date  t 
results in a lower Ht but a higher 
t A
tk H + for all .  1 k ≥
  It is important to note that (A3), the sufficient condition for Proposition 2 and 
Lemma 1, is empirically verifiable. Parameter B has two separate meanings in the 
model. A first interpretation is that B represents the productivity of higher education 
since it scales up the qualification of students. Alternatively, it represents the 
education wage gap between a skilled worker with a college degree relative to that of 
a low-skilled worker with high school and less. Using the information on m from 
Table 2, a testable hypothesis is to verify whether the education wage gap of any 
country exceeds the country-specific lower bound (1+m) and observe whether this 
condition is more easily satisfied for countries at different stages of economic 
development.
9 
                                                 
9See Hotchkiss and Shiferaw (2011) and the references therein for measurement and estimation 
methodologies of the education wage gap. 
  18  A puzzling outcome of Lemma 1 is that expanding the set   at date t results 
in a lower Ht. Suppose the cause of the increase in   is a technological improvement 
in primary education (a higher
t A
t A
ξ ). Some individuals who were planning initially to be 
low skilled now decide to study longer and therefore leave the ranks of low-skilled 
workers. The stock of human capital available for production Ht decreases in period t 
and the economy that observes also an outflow of physical capital faces a decline of 
output at the current date t as in Proposition 2. 
  4.  The Value of Public Funding of Higher Education 
Having described the sets of low- and high-skilled workers, we now turn to the main 
issue of our study, namely what is the role of a government in enhancing higher 
education? We shall investigate the conditions under which increasing public funding 
will enhance the formation of skilled workers and the resulting effects on economic 
growth and efficiency. This section will begin with the impact of public funding of 
higher education on the aggregate stock of human capital. We shall analyze the 
impact at date t first and then focus on the dynamic process and efficiency issues. 
 
Impact Effects 
On the expenditure side of its balance sheet the government faces public expenditure 
in higher education equal to  ( ) tt Ag μ . Enrollment in higher education is costly and 
requires a net payment from private sources equal to 
* () () tt t t A zA μμ − g . 
Therefore, 
* (1 ) tt gz −  represents  the  share of private investment in total 
expenditure on higher education. A decision by schools to charge a higher tuition fee 
 increases this share while a larger public support will decrease it. Data in Table 4 
reveal that in tertiary education the proportion of costs funded privately varies widely 
t z
∗
  19across our sample of countries. In Chile and Korea for example, public funding 
represents only a small part of investments in tertiary education. In contrast, 
approximately 73 percent of expenditure on higher education is public in the 
Netherlands. These stylized facts show that countries differ in their reliance on the 
government to fund advanced education. 



































      Notes: (a) Private funding of tertiary education as a 
    percentage of total tertiary expenditure; (b) In 2006; 
    (c) “-“ indicates not available. 
    Source: OECD (2009, Table B3.2b) 
 
  It is crucial to be more precise regarding the response of the threshold 
parameter    (defined in Proposition 1) to public funding, noting that the 
government budget must be balanced in equilibrium. For that, it is important to obtain 
the response of 
t Λ
* ( ) t t z g t X
ξ − to this subsidy. The left-hand side of (8) is simply  tt wH τ , 
a useful shorthand expression for government tax revenues. Denote by 
, 1 ,0 tt γ γ ≤≤ the fraction of government revenues at date t allocated to compulsory 
schooling. Then:  
(21)   X wH tt t t γ τ =  
(22)   ()( 1 ) g Aw tt tt H t μ γτ =−
 
  20With , public funding of higher education is zero ( 1 t γ = 0 t g = ) and tertiary education 
is fully privately financed. With 
*
tt gz = , higher education is fully publicly financed. 
Using the above equations: 
(23)  
(1 ) / ( ) ()
()
t tt zw H zg tt t t
Xw H tt t t
γτ μ
ξξ τγ




To obtain the effect of higher expenditure in compulsory schooling in equilibrium, we 



















⎧ ⎫ ∂− ⎪ ⎪ =− − ⎨ ⎬
∂ ⎪ ⎪ ⎩⎭
>0    ⇒
* () ( tt t t XA z g μ ξ −) > 
Namely, the partial derivative is positive as long as
* () ( tt t t XA z g μ ξ −) >. This 
condition holds generally since (i) per-student public expenditure on compulsory 
schooling  t X   is higher than per-student private expenditure on higher education 
, and (ii) 
* ( tt zg − ) ( ) 1 t A μ <  (less than 0.5 in many economies) and  1 ξ < . Using these 
observations, we obtain a positive effect of increasing the funding of compulsory 









Vice versa: an increase in public funding of higher education (a decrease in  ) t γ  leads 
to a decrease in the threshold level. Given this, we obtain the next results: 
 
Proposition 3: Assume that 
* () tt t XA z μ ξ >  holds at some period t. Increasing the 
public funding of higher education    leads in equilibrium to: (i) a larger set of 
skilled agents at date t+1; (ii) a lower total expenditure on education at date t; (iii)a 
lower stock of human capital Ht used in production at date t.  
t g
  21  The proof is to be found in the appendix. The above condition requires that the 
ratio of total expenditure on basic schooling to total spending on higher education is 
bounded from below by 1. ξ <  The fact that   decreases in period t corroborates the 
finding of Proposition 2 and extents the result to a more complex environment. From 
the proof of Proposition 3 we derive also the next result: 
t H
 
Corollary 2: In equilibrium with balanced budget the opportunity cost of increasing 
resources in favour of higher education is larger than unity. 
The reason is that some unskilled workers who previously contributed to tax revenues 
now become users of higher education subsidies to become skilled.  
 
Dynamic Analysis 
Now let us consider the effect of increasing public funding of higher education to 
enhance the formation of skilled labor (along a feasible education program). Consider 
the case where the government proposes two policies: either ‘no public funding’, i.e. 
, or the long-run policy  0 t g = 0 {} tt g
∞
= , which guarantees at each date t  the per-
student funding at a positive level  t g . At date t, let the set of families who opt for a 
‘skilled child’ under the ‘no funding’ policy be defined by: 
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Let us denote the set of families at period t who opt for a ‘skilled child’ under the  
'per-student public funding  t g ' policy by: 
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} = Λ  
  22  Reducing the private cost of higher education will expand the set of skilled 
labor, namely, we have:
0
t Λ< Λ t . We shall make in the following proposition an 
assumption regarding the ‘sensitivity’ of the set of skilled labor to changes in ‘initial 
endowment’, namely to variations in the threshold level  t Λ . Let us rewrite the 
aggregate human capital of generation t +1: 
(27)   11 1 1
~
() () [ () () () () ]
tt
tt t t t
AA
Hh d X B Zd Zd
ξ ω μω ω μω ω μω ++ + + == + ∫∫ ∫
)
 
Does a certain level of public funding of higher education enhance the formation of 
human capital, and hence growth in our economy?  The literature has some support 
for this claim (see, e.g., Bassanini and Scarpenta, 2001; Caucutt and Krishna, 2003; 
Blankenau, 2005; Arcalean and Schiopu, 2008). We show that in our framework such 
result depends on certain values for the parameters: 
 
Proposition 4:  Assume that initially there is no government intervention in financing 
higher education. Introducing public funding of higher education at the levels 
0 {} tt g
∞
= varies the corresponding threshold levels from 
0 {} t Λ  to {} t Λ . Define: 
(28)                      
0(1 ) tt t d Λ= Λ − ,   for t=1,2,….  
If   
*
tt t dg z ≤ holds for all t, then the introduction of such public funding policy 
increases the stock of human capital at all dates; namely, 
0
tt H H <   holds for all 
.  1 t ≥
 Note  that 
*
t t g z is the share of the public funding in the total cost of higher 
education  . Thus, if the sensitivity of the threshold levels to variations in the 
funding level is not ‘too high’, hence the resulting expansion of the set of skilled 




  23creation of human capital. This condition depends basically on the distribution of the 
initial endowments  0() Z ω   as well as the ‘smoothness’ of the human capital 
distributions in equilibrium and the density function of the random ability. Clearly, 
public investments in compulsory education over time matter as well. The condition 
assumed in Proposition 3 compares the per-student investment in compulsory 
schooling with the average cost of higher education at some given date. In Proposition 
4 condition (28) makes an assumption about the elasticity of the threshold levels for 
different levels of public funding. 
 
The Possibility of Inefficiency of Public Funding  
Proposition 4 has implications for economic growth. The human capital accumulation 
resulting from the public funding of higher education is expected to increase domestic 
marginal returns to physical capital and, hence, generate a foreign inflow of physical 
capital. The increase in both primary inputs will increase output. But does this 
outcome justify the diversion of public funds to finance higher education? 
  The answer depends on cost-benefit consideration: the relevant variable here is 
the  net value of labor at the current date, given the openness of this economy. 
Namely, it is the total additional income generated from this investment: The increase 
in labor income of generation t minus the public expenditure at date t on higher 
education. The reason is that, intergenerational transfers being given at the outset of 
each period, the working population’s only source of income is from labor.  
  To substantiate the assertion that society as a whole is not always better off 
when some public funds are used to finance higher education, consider the 
competitive equilibrium from some initial conditions of this economy and a given 
  24feasible education policy {( , )} tt X g . The net value of labor at date t, denoted by 
, is defined as:   (,) tt t WXg
       
  11 1 1
~
(,)[ ] ( )( ) ( )( ) ()
tt
t t t t ttttt ttt t
AA
W X gm w w hX B w hX g A
νξ νξ θω ω θω ω μ ++ + + =+ + − ∫∫t
Given some initial conditions at t=0, we say that a feasible education policy 
** {( , )} tt X g  dominates another feasible education policy {( , )} tt X g  if at any date t, 
switching from ( , ) tt X g  to 
** (, tt ) X g  is desirable in the following sense:  
 (a)        
** (,) (, ) ttt tt t WX g WXg > .
)
 (b)   At each date k , k>t , if the government has to choose between these two 
  education policies , then 
** (, kk X g
) k
 will have a higher net value of  labor, i.e.,   
  . 
** (,) (, kk k kk WXg WXg >
Thus, from the definition we see that the policy 
** {( , )} tt X g
{(
ˆ ˆ {( , Xg
generates more net 
aggregate income for each generation, given that each generation compares these two 
options under the current distribution of human capital at the outset of the period. Let 
us compare now the no-public funding policy, denoted by   and the 
full-public funding policy (discussed earlier), denoted by    
00 , 0)} tt Xg =
*)}: tt t z =
 
Proposition 5: Assume that the following two conditions hold:  
(29)      
0*
tt Xz ξ >       for all dates t,  and   
(30)       
1
*0 [1 ] 1 tt t Bz w H
ξ τ −≤  ,    for all dates t.  
Then, the no-public funding policy dominates the full-public funding policy. 
 
  25  The proof is to be found in the appendix. Though condition (29) is tighter than 
what has been assumed in Proposition 4, it remains a mild assumption. Condition (30) 
requires that B should not be 'too large' and/or the per-student cost of higher education 
is not too 'small' compared to the average per-student public education expenditure.  
Also, when ξ   is close to 1 and B is not ‘too high’ it helps condition (30) to be 
satisfied. Under these assumptions the cases where the government does not allocate 
public funds to higher education may be “better” from the point of view of economic 
efficiency than the fully-funded cases (which we observe in many European 
countries). 
 5.  Political Equilibrium 
So far we assumed that the allocation of the public education funds (hence  t γ ) within 
the educational system is exogenously given. This assumption is questionable since 
the allocation of government revenues between these two types of education stages is 
likely to vary with changes in the educational technology of early education vs. 
college education, market conditions at home and abroad, etc. Moreover, Table 5 that 
compares the shares of public expenditure on tertiary education (as a percentage of 
total public expenditure on education) reveals a large diversity between countries: the 
largest share  t γ  is observed for Turkey; Korea and Chile have the smallest shares. 
Clearly the latter countries rely heavily on private funding to finance higher 
education. 
  In economies with heterogeneous agents, the choice of an ‘optimal’  t γ  can be 
determined via the outcome of some political process at each date. It is possible to 
establish a mapping between the set of heterogeneous agents, given their preferences 
regarding education, and an ‘optimal’ education policy determined by majority 
  26voting. Economies at different stages of development, with a different composition of 
the labor force between skilled and low-skilled workers, are then expected to reach 
different political equilibria regarding this educational budget allocation.  
  Table 5:     Public Expenditure on Tertiary Education 
a,b 


























  N o t e s :   (a) As a percentage of total public expenditure on  
    education; (b) In 2007. 
  Source: Authors’ own calculations based on OECD (2009, Table B4.1) 
Preferences of Agents 
As we have observed earlier in (18), maximization of utility by an agent is equivalent 
to the maximization of his/her offspring’s income. Let us therefore express individual 
income as a function of  t γ  by substituting away  t X  and  () tt g A μ . Making use of (5), 
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Given the parameters at each date t including   and  t H () t y ω , both expressions for 
next generation’s income are strictly concave function of  [ t 0,1]. γ ∈  This implies that 
the optimal choice  () t γ ω  of each agent is unique.  
  Assume now that each individual votes either for no public funding, i.e., 
, or for public funding at level  0 t g = tt g g = . The choice will be determined by 
comparing the income of his/her offspring under these two policies; namely, given 
  271() t Z ω +  we compare  1()
l
t y ω + under 0 t g =  to  1()
s
t y ω +  under  tt g g = . Denote by  t γ   the 
fraction of the education budget assigned to compulsory schooling when higher 
education is publicly funded with  tt g g = . The condition that determines voting in 
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Rearranging terms implies: 


































Like   in Proposition 1,   in (31) is another threshold that partitions the distribution 
of endowments, namely between those who favour public funding for higher 
education at level g=
t Λ t v
t g   versus those in favour of the alternative policy g . 
Namely, all voters whose endowment is such that 
0 t =
1() tt Z v ω + ≥  will vote in favour of 
public funding, all others will vote against.  
The threshold   is another channel through which international market conditions 
affect the education system. For example, a higher wage/rental ratio at the next period 
(resulting from globalization and liberalization of capital markets) implies a larger 
group of individuals who support 
t v
t gg =   Also partition parameter   responds 
negatively to the changes in the following parameters: (i) In a society endowed with a 
larger stock of human capital 
t v
t H   more people support larger public resources be 
allocated to higher education; (ii) As public education expenditures ( tt wH τ ) increase 
  28more individuals support an increase in resources for higher education; (iii) A lower 
value of m or larger value of ξ  imply more support for the policy  t gg = . Again, it is 
notable that   does not depend on the intensity of altruism.  t v
  Further insights into the voting behaviour of individuals in generation t, which 
are summarized in the next two claims, can be gained by comparing the position of 
partition parameters in the distribution of endowments: 
Claim 1:  > t v t Λ . 
Claim 2: 
0
t Λ< Λ t  holds for all t. 
The proofs of the two claims are included in the appendix. The following corollaries 
follow directly from Claim 1 and Claim 2: 
Corollary 3: Some of the agents who voted against instituting public funding for 
higher education will invest in higher education when public funding is provided. 
Corollary 4: Some of the households who did not invest in higher education under the 




In order to reach a political equilibrium, what matters is to know the relative position 
of the median voter in the distribution of initial endowments. Let 'M' denote the 
median voter and let  11 () () () tt t Z MM h M
ν θ ++ = %  be his/her initial endowment. Hence:  
Proposition 6: When the allocation of resources invested in public education is 
determined by a political equilibrium, applying the Median Voter theorem implies 
that public funding is approved, i.e., tt g g = , if and only if  1() tt Z Mv + ≥ . Thus the shape 
  29of the distribution of endowments in generation t matters for the determination of the 
equilibrium. 
  We obtain that in a society with a majority of low-skilled workers with low 
endowments the median voter is in favour of not allocating public resources to college 
education (Blankenau et al., 2007a). This result is clear in a small open economy: 
parents of generation t who are aware that their child is becoming a low-skilled 
worker will not benefit from supporting public funding for higher education. They 
perceive public funds assigned for higher education as a net transfer of government 
resources from them to individuals who shall mostly have high income in the future.
10 
 6.  Concluding Remarks 
Is it always desirable that public funds be used to finance higher education? It is the 
main question that has been raised by this paper. The answer may depend on the 
underlying features of the economy, such as cost and productivity of the higher 
education system and other parameters describing the process of skill formation. In 
some cases we demonstrate that such public funding will enhance the formation of 
human capital and thus promote economic growth. We also derive conditions under 
which public financing of higher education is inefficient. In other words, in some 
small open economies refraining from using public resources for higher education can 
'dominate' the regime in which the government fully funds higher education. Thus, 
using public funds to send 'low quality' students to college may be inefficient since 
the government has better alternatives like using these resources to improve the 
compulsory schooling system (which is benefiting all students).  
                                                 
10If, in addition, the conditions of Proposition 5 are met, then the choice of low-skilled voters is 
desirable as well. In richer economies with a majority of skilled workers the allocation of resources 
depends on the shape of the distribution of endowments of individuals in that generation. If the 
condition of Proposition 6 is met, the government allocates public resources to higher education and 
the predictions of Propositions 3 and 4 are applicable in this context. 
   
  30  The tremendous expansion of globalization in the last three decades has 
affected small open economies very significantly and its impact on education policy 
and skill formation is a significant topic. The relevant theoretical literature (see, e.g., 
De Fraja, 2002, and many others) has studied educational policies mostly within 
closed economies, while our aim was to promote our understanding of these 
relationships in small open economies. We explore the role of international capital 
mobility in affecting education choices as well as governmental decisions related to 
public funding. Our results may be relevant to certain small open economies but not 
to others. Some of the conditions we have assumed are related to the productivity of 
advanced education, the cost of attaining skills, the prices of international factors and 
the importance of the initial distribution of human capital among countries.  
         The framework we have applied has several important features, some of which 
contribute to our results in a significant way. For example, we take into account 
parental altruism and the opportunity cost of attending higher education. It is not clear 
to us how robust the results are when we dispose of such assumptions. However, we 
feel comfortable with such assumptions since they add realism to the analysis. 
Though we have allocated individuals in this economy to groups of skilled and low-
skilled workers we abstained from studying the effects of international factors on 
income inequality. This important issue should be considered in future research. In a 
different framework, Viaene and Zilcha (2002) have examined the effect of 
international factors on income distribution in equilibrium.  
  31  7.  Appendix 
Proof of Proposition 1: Consider the case where the child is skilled. Substitute first 
order conditions in (11) and solve for  ( ) t b ω . Making use of (17) we are able to solve 
for  1()
s




. Repeat the same steps for the case where the same child is low skilled to 
derive ) ω + . Hence,  
    11 () () () ()
sl s l
tt t t yy U U ω ωω ++ ≥⇔ ≥ ω
1 t w + +
 
implies: 
    11 1 1 ( 1 ) ()() ( 1 ) ()() [ ( 1 ) ] tt t t t tt t t t Bh X w z h X w r m
νξ νξ τ θ ωω τ θ ωω ++ + + −− ≥ − + %%
Note that this inequality holds only if condition (19) holds. Moreover, it is easy to 
verify that when (19) holds the set of skilled individuals is given by (20).    ■ 
 
Proof of Corollary 1:  Let us rewrite the condition that defines the set of individuals 




























t = Λ  
Assume that in date t we have a higher interest rate  1 (1 ) t r+ + ; this implies a lower 
wage-rental ratio  1 (1 ) tt wr + + 1 + . As a result, note that condition (19) remains valid, 
examining the definition of    we find that the value of  t A t Λ   increases since the 
private investment  and public investment in compulsory schooling   remain 
unchanged. Hence the set of skilled agents   shrinks. Similarly, lowering the rate of 






Λ , hence expanding the set of skilled workers  .    ■  t A
 
 








Hhd m h d ω μω ω μω = + + ∫∫
 
As  increases, the first term in this expression remains unchanged while the second 
decreases. Hence Ht drops. Consider now later periods: 
t A
   1
11 2
~




hd m Hh ωμ ω d ω μω
+
++ + =+ ∫∫
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11 1 2
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hd hd m h Hd ωμ ω ωμ ω ω μω
+
++ + + =+ + ∫∫ ∫  
There are two effects. First, low-skilled workers join the skilled workforce:   
increases but ∼  decreases by the same number. Second, low-skilled workers induce 
their child to be low-skilled workers as well but at date 
t A
t A
1 t +  because of the 
endowment condition: ∼  decreases  (hence  1 t A + 1 t A +   expands). Consider now two 
situations and denote the corresponding sets of skilled workers by: 
1
t A  and 
0








. Since we transfer unskilled workers to skilled ones we obtain that 
t ω μω + ∫   increases. On the other hand, since  1 t A +   expands we obtain that 
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Let us denote by    = [~ t Δ
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t A ]  ⁄ [~
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  33This implies that
1
10 0
11 1 () ()
t
tt t HHm h d ω μω
+
++ + Δ −≥ ∫
0
1 t
. This process can be continued for 
all coming dates since we obtained that  A +  also expands. Thus our claim is proved.■ 
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ξ  decreases, which clearly implies a decrease in t X . Since  declines 




( tt ) t X gA μ + must decrease as well even though g ( ) t A t μ increases. Thus, total 
expenditures on education decrease. The drop in  t X  is larger than the initial increase 
in : the marginal rate of substitution between  t g t X and   is therefore larger than 1 in 
absolute value.     ■  
t g




t z z =  and hence, 
*











ξξ ξξ =−= −  
































Now, let us define 
~ () () () () ()
tt
tt AA Qg B h d h d
νν ω μω ω μω =+ ∫∫ and  write  the 
expressions for the ratio of generational aggregate human capital: 









HX Q g d Q g












t Λ< Λ t  the set of skilled with the subsidy contains (strictly) the set under 0 
subsidy, namely:  tt A A ⊂  , hence  () ( 0 ) t Qg Q > . Thus, by our assumption, we obtain 
that 
0
1 t 1 t H H + < +  for all t. ■ 
Proof of Proposition 5: Suppose that we switch from zero-public funding to full-
public funding at date t. Comparing the net labor income in these two cases, the 
Proposition requires that:   
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But the right hand side of (A1) can be rewritten as follows: 
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t A sufficient condition for this inequality to be satisfied is: 
0 ˆ () t XB X





ξ ≥ . Rewritting this inequality:  
(A2)           
1
0* ˆ [] tt tt t wH B wH z
ξ ττ ≥−  
Using Proposition 3 we obtain that by increasing public funding from    to 
 the period t stock of human capital will decline; namely, that 
0 0 t g =
0
t
* ˆt gz = t ˆ
t H H < . Now, 












≥− 0 ]  .  Thus, we attain that condition (30) of 
  35the Proposition implies condition (A2). Now, in each date k >t , given the initial 
distribution of human capital, a choice between these two public funding regimes 
requires the same type of comparison as we did for date t. Hence, when the conditions 
required in this Proposition hold at date k we obtain the same outcome.  ■ 
Proof of Claim 1:  Let us rewrite the expression for   as follows:   t v
































From (31) and (A.3) we see easily that  > t v t Λ  holds if and only if : 
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which holds since () t
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